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GIFTS OF RIGHTS UNDER CONTRACTS IN
WRITING BY DELIVERY OF THE WRITING
SATUEL WILLISTONO
MR. PAUL BRUTON in a recent number of the YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL:, criticises a rule of the Restatemen? t of Coztracts 2 which
states that a gratuitous assignment is revocable except in three
classes of cases, one of which is where the "assigned right is
evidenced by a tangible token or writing, the surrender of
which is required by the obligor's contract for its enforcement,
and this token or writing is delivered to the assignee." It is
contended by Mr. Bruton that this rule is too restricted, and
that delivery to an assignee of any written contract between
the obligor and the assignor is a sufficient formality to make a
gift irrevocable.
As the draftsman of the rule criticized, and, though acting
with advisers, as the person primarily responsible, I should like
to set forth the reasons supporting it.
The rule of which a portion has just been quoted states three
possible ways of making an irrevocable assignment of a contract
right without consideration, namely:
(1) by such a writing as would transfer ownership of a
chattel without delivery;
(2) by the deliver of the kind of token or writing specified
in the words quoted above;
(3) by any oral or written assignment if the owner should
reasonably expect action of a definite and substantial
character to be induced thereby, and such action is in-
duced.
The first of these methods 'is obviously always a possible
means of transferring any contractual right that is capable of
*]Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School; Reporter for the R-
STATEMENT OF Tim LAW OF CONTRACTS.
:(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 837.
2 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW o CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 158.
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transfer. The kind of writing which is necessary in order to,
transfer a chattel without delivery may differ in the various.
states. At common law presumably a sealed instrument was
necessary,3 but doubtless, at least in states where seals have
been abolished, and very likely in many other states, a formal
unsealed writing, or perhaps even an informal writing, would
be sufficient. There is undoubtedly considerable advantage in
putting written transfers of choses in action and of tangible
property upon the same footing. The third method follows the
analogy of a rule stated in Section 90 of the Restatement of
Contrcets to the effect that a promise becomes binding under
similar circumstances. It is the propriety of the limitation in
the second method that Mr. Bruton criticises.
At the outset of any discussion of the matter it should be ob.
served that the Restatement deals only with the assignment of
contractual rights and has no application to the transfer of
equitable choses in action or of property rights. But in regard
to contractual rights the rule is stated as applicable to all gifta
whether made inter vivos or causa mortis.
Mr. Bruton bases his conclusion upon a considerable exam-
ination of the decisions, and also upon the assertion, made with-
out much argument, that the rule he suggests conforms to wise
policy. I shall discuss only briefly the English decisions that
Mr. Bruton has collected. Certainly, however, they afford little
countenance to those who deem the rule of the Restatement too
closely restricted.
Since an assignment of a chose in action prior to the Judica-
ture Act of 1873 could in no event transfer more than an equi-
table right, according to the conception of the English courts,
the maxim that equity will not aid a volunteer was a stumbling
block in the way of donees and, so far as concerns gifts inter
vivos of choses in action, probably an insurmountable one.
In 1900 Edward Jenks wrote an article in the Law Quarterly
Review controverting the assertion of Sir William R. Anson
in his treatise on contracts that consideration is an invariable
requisite of an irrevocable assignment inter vivos.4 Mr. Jenks
admits at the outset: "Snell propounds the rule with almost
equal breadth. (Equity, 12th ed. p. 85). Leake, though he
confines himself to equitable assignments, apparently commits
himself to a similar doctrine. (Law of Contracts, 3d. ed. p.
997)." Mr. Jenks himself does not contend for more than this,
that consideration is not essential unless the assignment is "im-
perfect." In that case he deems consideration necessary, and
further admits that "voluntary assignees of choses in action
3 Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B. D. 57 (1890).
4 Jenks, Consideration and the Assignment of Choses in Action (1900)
16 L. Q. Rnv. 241.
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may be postponed (at any rate where their titles are not pro-
tected by the Judicature Act) to subsequent acquirers with a
better claim." Sir William R. Anson, replying in the following
year to this article, persisted in his assertion that aside from
the Judicature Act, and probably even in cases under the Judi-
cature Act, consideration is always necessary in order to render
an assignment inter vivos irrevocable2 His chief reliance was
upon Edwards v. Jones," where the delivery of a bond indorsed
with words of assignment by the payee was held insufficient to
give the donee title against the executor of the donor.
In 1911 Professor George P. Costigan wrote in the same re-
view a more elaborate article entitled Gifts Inter itros of Choses
in Action7 His conclusion was:
"Edwiards v. Jones 81 does stand unreversed, however, and is
in fact reinforced by Milrvy v. Lord.01 Probably, therefore, prior
to the Judicature Act of 1873, an assignment of a legal chose
in action was not valid unless the assignee gave consideration
for it or reduced the chwse to possession prior to a revocation
of authority, or unless the assignment was made by way of gift
causa mortis."20
The English courts have been more lenient in regard to gifts
causa mortis than in regard to gifts inter vivos, apparently on
the ground that in the former case the donor, being dead, can
no longer do anything further to validate an intended gift. If
the subject matter of an attempted gift cousa inortis is a docu-
ment of the right kind, equity makes an exception to its rule
that it will not aid a volunteer. The distinction between gifts
inter vivos and gifts causa mnortis is not made in the American
cases so far as concerns the essentials necessary to complete a
gift, and, as Professor Costigan remarks of the reason given
above for the distinction, "while that may explain the difference
in the rule as to gifts causa, mortis from that as to gifts inter
vivos, it does not justify that difference." 2' It may be added
that in the great majority of absolute gifts that come in ques-
tion, the donor likewise is dead when the controversy arises,
and frequently is dying when the gift is made or attempted.
There is, however, a satisfactory reason for the allowance by
the English courts of gifts causa mortis to the extent that they
have gone. The refusal to admit a power to make gifts izter"
vivos by the delivery of documents of the character by which
effective gifts causa, mortis have been made, on the technical
5Anson, Aesignment of Choses in Action (1901) 17 L. Q. REV. 90.
61 Myl. & C. 226 (1836).
727 L. Q. REv. 326.
8 Supra note 6.
9 4 De G. F. & J. 264 (1862).
10 27 L. Q. REv. at 334.
1 Ibid. 331, n. 3.
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ground that equity will not aid a volunteer, is objectionable and
has rightly not been followed by the American courts.
The Judicature Act of 1873 provides that an absolute assign-
ment in writing of a debt or other legal chose in action, of
which express notice in writing is given to the debtor, shall be
effectual in law to transfer the legal right to the debt or chose
in action, subject, however, to all equities which would previ-
ously have been entitled to priority. Sir William R. Anson con-
tended that as this Statute said nothing about consideration,
it did not affect the rule in that respect. Professor Costigan
was of the opinion that "while Sir W. R. Anson appears to
have had the better of the argument on the cases prior to the
Judicature Act, Professor Jenks appears to have had the better
of the argument so far as the effect of that Act was con-
cerned." 22 This conclusion, so far as concerns the effectiveness
of a gratuitous written assignment of an existing right, is
borne out by later decisions of the English court holding such
an assignment effective. 3 The Judicature Act leaves unaf-
fected, however, the problem of whether a valid gift of a right
under a written contract may be made by delivery of the writ-
ing, without the assignment itself being in writing. Probably
this is still impossible.' 4
Assuming, as I am willing to do, that the closely restricted
English law as to assignments inter vivos is neither actual
nor desirable law in the United States, the effect of the Eng-
lish decisions on gifts causc mortis may be considered.
One of the earliest cases on the subject, and th leading one,
is Ward v. Tur'ner,15 holding a gift cavsa nortis of receipts for
South Sea annuities in the hands of a third person ineffective
to transfer a right to the annuities. Of this decision Mr. Bru-
ton rightly says:
"(1) It held that delivery, in the sense of transfer of control,
was as necessary in gifts of choses in action as it was in gifts
of tangible property. Proof of donative intent alone was as
ineffectual in one type of case as in the other. (2) Since the
delivery required was transfer of control, the case determined
the kind of a delivery which would satisfy this test as applied
to a chose in action. Only the transfer of a document which
12 Ibid. 339.
13 Hambleton v. Brown, [1917] 2 K. B. 93; In re Westerton, [1919] 2 Ch.
104. An assignment of a future right is revocable unless supported by
consideration. Tailby v. Official Receiver, 13 App. Cas. 523 (1888).
1' Though Edwards v. Jones, spra note 6, on its exact facts would pre-
sumably not be followed since the Judicature Act of 1873, inasmuch as an
assignment was written on the back of the bond which was the subject of
the gift (see In e Patrick, [1891] 1 Ch. 82; Lee v. Magrath, L. R. 10 Ir.
313 (1882)), apart from this feature it seems that the attempted gift of
the bond would still be held invalid.
15 2 Ves. Sr. 431 (1752).
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would deprive the donor of the means of enforcing the chose
would satisfy the test. For this purpose delivery of a specialty
would do, but not the transfer of a simple writing, however
strikingly that writing might evidence the chose." 26
Mr. Bruton endeavors to rest the decision on the requirement
of profert, and says that shortly after this decision "the whole
basis of it was swept away," because the rule requiring profert
was abolished. Here, I think, is Mr. Bruton's error. Lord
Hardwicke indeed refers to profert as one reason for dis-
tinguishing invalid gifts of such choses in action as he was con-
sidering from a gift of a bond which he had previously upheld. 7
He added, however, with reference to such a gift:
"Another thing made it amount to a delivery, that the law
allows it a locality; and therefore a bond is bona notabilict so as
to require a prerogative administration, where a bond is in one
diocese, and goods in another." Il
He might have said more to show that profert was only one inci-
dent of a quality distinguishing sealed instruments from infor-
mal contracts; and this distinguishing quality, so far from being
swept away since Lord Hardwicke's time, still persists and has
been recognized as existing in other documents than contracts
under seal.
Mr. Bruton correctly says that "The framers of the Restate-
iment admit [he might have said, assert] that an obligation evi-
denced by a non-negotiable bond, a life insurance policy, or a
certificate of stock, -may be irrevocably assigned by the delivery
of the document." He adds, however, "Just how these instru-
ments differ from the ordinary -written contract is not made
clear." 19 The function of the Restatement is to state the law,
not to explain why certain rules exist. Anomalies do exist some-
times; but in this instance there is no anomaly.
The difference between instruments that are dealt with not
only by the law but by business custom as chattels having in-
trinsic value and not value merely as evidence of intangible
rights is old, and cuts deeply into the law not only in its earlier
stages but at the present time. It takes little reading of the
common law to discover the importance attached to the instru-
ment itself if under seal, for other reasons than the requirement
of profert. Negotiable instruments were later recognized as
having similar incidents, and even non-negotiable bills of ex-
change and promissory notes share the same character.
Policies of insurance are generally under seal and in any event
1.6 39 YALE L. J. at 842, 843.
17 Baily v. Snelgrove (1744), stated in the opinion of Ward v. Turner,
supra note 15.
IsWard v. Turner, supra note 15.
19 39 YAIa L. J. at 838, n. 7.
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partake of the nature of specialties." The same principle ob-
viously applies to certificates of stock. The failure of the Eng-
lish Court to recognize this is unfortunate, but the American
cases in doing so are clearly right, judged both by legal analogy
and by business custom.
A demand upon a debtor under an ordinary written contract
to perform his duty will not ordinarily be met by a request to
produce and surrender the writing; and such a request, if made,
it is submitted, need not be complied with. The creditor's right
is not conditional upon compliance with the request. It is
otherwise with the documents of which the rule of the Restatc-
ment permits gifts by mere delivery. Possession of the docu-
ment, therefore, controls the enforcement of the right. Such
documents are for this reason proper symbols of the intangible
rights that they evidence.
Mr. Bruton says that "nothing has been more confusing in
the law of gifts than this question-begging, mind-befogging,
dominion concept." 21- The application of the adjective "ques-
tion-begging" I find difficult to comprehend. It is an objurga-
tory epithet but seems otherwise meaningless in this connection.
The concept is "mind-befogging" if one attempts to find domin-
ion where there is none, as possibly a few cases have done, but
it is clarifying if one makes no such attempt. Mr. Bruton, in-
deed, virtually seeks to use the test himself in his argument
that since any written contract is "best evidence" and must be
produced or accounted for in any litigation against the debtor,
all written contracts stand on the same plane as bonds, of which
profert was formerly necessary, but which now when made the
subject of litigation are only "best evidence," as is the case with
informal contracts. His error is in looking only at the proce-
dure in litigation to determine the kind of document that con-
trols the intangible right.
Mr. Bruton leans heavily upon the case of Moore v. Darton,21
as establishing a wider rule than that of Ward v. Turner.21
Moore v. Darton, as Mr. Bruton himself says, was not a case
of assignment. The document in question was given to an agent
of the debtor for the purpose of discharging the debt. On any
view, however, the case is decided correctly since the document
was not simply a receipt; it was a non-negotiable promissory
note.24 The reasoning of Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce is brief
20 LANGDELL, Sumimi ARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880) § 49.
21 39 YALE L. J. at 857.
22 4 DeG. & S. 517 (1851).
,2 Supra note 15.
24 Mr. Bruton states, 39 YALE L. J. at 848, that the rule in Moore v.
Darton is the logical basis for holding that a gift of a promissory note may
be made by delivery, but that the courts have never explained the theory of
their decisions on this subject.
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and does not purport to lay down any general rule. He certainly
says as part of his reasoning that "proof of the writing, if
possible, was essential to recovery." If, however, Mr. Bruton
means to intimate that the single judge who decided the case
meant to establish or did establish for the English courts a rule
that any written contract which must be proved in litigation
by its production, if that is possible, may by its delivery with
donative intent be the subject of an effective gift, the sugges-
tion is a bold one. On its facts the case is within the rule of
the Restatement that is criticised.
Nor has any subsequent English or Irish decision gone fur-
ther. Gifts of unindorsed negotiable paper,2 bankers' deposit
notes 23 (which, in the United States, are called certificates of
deposit, and are in fact non-negotiable promissory notes), of
savings bank books,27 have been upheld; but, as said by the Irish
court,2 8 "In all the cases which have been cited where the gift
has been upheld the document or deed was essential to the re-
covely of the debt." And though these words might in them-
selves seem wide enough to cover any document that must be
produced if the claim is litigated, for example the most abbre-
viated memorandum of a contract within the Statute of Frauds,
I believe the meaning of the Court was the same as that of
Byrne, J., in a later case who, in support of his decision that a
savings bank book might be the subject of a gift causa nortis,
said, "It must as stated on the face of it be produced whenever
any money is drawn or deposited." 2
The recent decision in the Irish Free State of IL re MeWey o
is directly opposed to the rule that Mr. Bruton believes may
be drawn from the English cases. The document in question
in that case was a receipt for money received for India stock.
The receipt stated fully the terms of the contract, but it also
stated not only that the receipt was not negotiable but that the
"stockholders to protect themselves from fraud can accept by
themselves or their attorneys all transfers made to them." Coun-
sel in arguing that the attempted gift failed said:
"These are not documents of title, but mere proofs of payment
of consideration. They are not to be delivered upon a transfer;
251In re Mead, 15 Ch. D. 651 (1880); Clement v. Cheesman, 27 Ch. D.
631 (1884).
26 Amis v. Witt, 33 Beav. 619 (1863) ; In re Taylor, 56 L. 3. 597 (1887);
In re Farnam, 57 L. J. 637 (1887); Cassidy v. Belfast Banking Co., 22 L. R.
Ir. 68 (1887); In re Dillon, 44 Ch. D. 76 (1890); Porter v. Walsh, [1895]
1 Ir. R. 284; Cdin v. Moon, [1896] 2 Q. B. 283.
2In re Weston, [1902] 1 Ch. 680.
2s Duckworth v. Lee, [1899] 1 Ir. R. 405, 407 (holding the gift of an
I. 0. U. ineffectual to transfer a right).
29 In re Weston, supra note 27.
30 [1928] Ir. R. 486.
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and there may be any number of persons (the previous holders)
in possession of receipts given in respect of the holdings. Thus
the deceased in parting with the receipts did not part with the
possession of, or dominion over, the stock. Neither would one
who had legally effected a transfer and retained a receipt have
retained a document of title or anything which would leave in
him dominion over the property. The donor must part with
the possession of, and the dominion over, the property."
This argument was sustained, the court saying:
"To hold that [the gift] is sufficient would, in my opinion, be
to hold that the case of Weard v. Turner 2 is no longer good law.
But the authority of that case was recognized by the house of
Lords in Duffield v. Elwes,33 and was followed in Moore v.
Moore,34 and, as was held in the last-mentioned case, so I hold
in this, that the receipts in question here do not differ sub-
stantially from the receipts for the South Sea Annuities, which
were the subject-matter in Ward v. Turner. In re Andrew's -6
belongs to the same line of authorities." 1,
In the United States with general consistency it has been
held that bonds, unindorsed bills and promissory notes, certifi-
cates of deposits, policies of insurance, savings bank books, and
unindorsed certificates of stock, delivered with donative intent,
give the donee a perfect right.3 7 The general ratio decidendi
of the cases is that the possession of the document gives control
of the intangible right, and that this control or dominion is
essential. On. the other hand gifts of checking account pass
rights to the accounts.8 8 In these latter cases the intent to
give is found as a fact and the delivery of the pass-book might
seem to conform to the vague rule sometimes suggested that
the donor must make "such delivery as the nature of the case
admits." Nevertheless the gift is held incomplete; the cases
books have almost uniformly been held ineffectual to transfer
31 Ibid. 489.
3 Supra note 15.
33 1 Bli. (N. s.) 497, 536, 540 (1827).
34L. R. 18 Eq. 474, 483 (1874).
35 [1902] 2 Ch. 394.
36 [1928] Ir. R. at 491.
37 The cases are collected by Mr. Bruton, 39 YALE L. 3. at 852, 853.
as Jones v. Weakley, 99 Ala. 441, 12 So. 420 (1892); Thomas v. Lewis,
89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389 (1892); Dinley v. McCullagh, 92 Hun 454, 36 X. Y.
Supp. 1007 (1895); Wilson v. Featherston, 122 N. C. 747, 30 S. E. 325
(1898); Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 At. 45 (1899); Williams'
Est., 11 Pa. D. & C. 636 (1902). See also McGonnell v. Mvurray, Ir R.
3 Eq. 460 (1869) ; Pace v. Pace, 107 Miss. 292, 293, 65 So. 273, 274 (1914) ;
Provident Institution v. Sisters of the Poor, 87 N. J. Eq. 424, 431, 100 Atl.
894, 897 (1916), aff'd, 88 N. J. Eq. 349, 102 Atl. 1053 (1917).
The decisions in Kentucky are otherwise. Stephenson v. King, 81 Ky.
425 (1883); see McCoy's Administrator v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 788, 104
S. W. 1031, 1032 (1907).
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distinguish the gift of a savings bank book in some such language
as that used by the M laryland court:
"Possession of a deposit-book in such a bank does not give
a dominion or control over the fund, and hence cannot operate,
by a delivery to transfer ownership of the money deposited." -^
More generally, the United States Supreme Court has said, after
an elaborate examination of authorities:
"The point, which is made clear by this review of the decisions
on the subject, as to the nature and effect of a delivery of a
chose in action, is, as we think, that the instrument or document
must be the evidence of a subsisting obligation and be delivered
to the donee, so as to vest him with an equitable title to the
fund it represents, and to divest the donor of all present control
and dominion over it, absolutely and irrevocably, in case of a
gift inter vivos, but upon the recognized conditions subsequent,
in case of a gift mortis cause."
What authority has Mr. Bruton to show that the courts in
stressing the requirement of control or dominion do not give
a correct reason for their decisions, a reason that they will habit-
ually apply? Sometimes, no doubt what courts do is so clearly
at variance with what they say that we are compelled to seek
a ratio decidendi that is inconsistent with that given in the judi-
cial opinions. But the variance between facts and stated grounds
of decision should be clear and should exist in more than oc-
casional decisions in order to justify the conclusion that while
courts decide correctly, they do not know why they are correct.
Perhaps Mr. Bruton places his chief reliance upon several
cases holding that a gift of a "receipt" is effective. As in the
case of Moore v. Darton,41 however, the receipts in question
were neither mere receipts nor ordinary written contracts. They
acknowledged the receipt either of money or of property, and
promised either to hold the money as a trust or to repay it as a
debt or to return the property. If there is a trust, the chose
in action is an equitable one and not within the rules of the
Restatement.4 2 If there is a promise to repay money as a debt,
as in Moore v. Darton, the instrument is a promissory note.
39 Whalen v. Milholland, supra note 38.
40 Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 614, 2 Sup. Ct. 415, 422 (1882).41 Supra note 22.
4 Such was the case of Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111 (1808)
where the gifts were by the beneficiary to the trustee. In Stephenson's
Estate v. King, 81 Ky. 425 (1883), also, the donor though called an agent
seems to have been in fact a trustee of the securities payable to bearer
which were the subject of the gift. More clearly in Clayton v. Pierson,
55 W. Va. 167, 46 S. E. 935 (1904), where the document recited the receipt
of $1100 "for safe keeping" there was a trust. It is evident the money
delivered was not to be kept in specie, and yet was not to be dealt with
as an ordinary debt.
19301
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The other cases of receipts that Mr. Bruton cites were evi-
dence of bailments, and the gifts were of the bailed property.43
More perhaps can be said in favor of allowing a receipt of this
nature to give a donee an irrevocable right to bailed property
than can be said for allowing gifts of contract rights generally
to be made by delivery of a written contract. Demand of the
surrender of such receipts is usually made when return is re-
quested of the property deposited, and frequently the receipts
contain an express requirement to this effect. The analogy to
bills of lading and warehouse receipts readily suggests itself.
There has been great confusion in the law as to whether a
"straight" bill of lading or warehouse receipt, i.e. one not in
terms negotiable, should be treated as a document of title, de-
livery of which is equivalent to delivery of the goods them-
selves.44 I think it better to confine this attribute to documents
where the delivery is to be made to order, and recent statutes
have generally brought about this result so far as sales of chat-
tels are concerned; but in view of the dispute on this point and
the fact that the gifts attempted in these cases are of property,
such an analogy deserves little weight in the consideration of
methods of assigning contractual rights.45 Especially is this
so in view of the fact that In re MeWey " decided that where
the receipt contained a provision that it need not be presented
in order to secure performance of the signer's duty, an irrevo-
cable gift could not be made by delivery of the receipt.
-3 Kaufmann v. Parmele, 99 Neb. 622, 157 N. W. 342 (1916); Lipson v.
Evans, 133 Md. 370, 105 Atl. 312 (1918) ; Goldsworthy v. Johnson, 45 Nov.
355, 204 Pac. 505 (1922), are of this character. Of the Maryland and
Nevada cases Mr. Bruton says: "An indorsement and written assignment
appeared on the back of the receipts but the courts lay no emphasis on this
fact." The facts seem otherwise. In both cases the assignment was formal
and relied upon by the Court. In the Maryland case the assignment was
under seal and the court states in its reasons for upholding the gift that
"the assignment was apparently under the hand and seal of Evans and so
written on the receipt." In the Nevada case the court said of the donor's
act: "It was physically impossible for her to deliver the bonds. She did
the next best thing; she gave an order to the bank, written on the back of
the receipt which it had given her for the money paid for the bonds, for
their delivery to the donee, and simultaneously executed and delivered to
the donee the writing wherein she said: 'It is my wish that D. S. Johnson
have the liberty bonds.'"
44 See WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 413.
45 It is true that in the cases referred to supra note 43 the property in
question was bonds or certificates of stock which are themselves choses in
action, but it was the bonds or certificates which the receipts referred to,
and which were professed to be given, not the intangible rights that they
represented which were against other persons than the signers of the re-
ceipts. The gifts were not merely of the donors' contract rights against
the bailees for the redelivery of the documents, but were gifts of the docu-
ments themselves as chattels.
46 Supra note 30.
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Nothing further that can be deemed to support Mr. Bruton's
theory is cited by him except the case of In re Huggins' Estate,
4 7
where delivery by the donor, with proper intent, of a written
contract to convey certain coal rights for $1800 was held to ef-
fect an irrevocable gift of the right to the money 5
I think it advisable in considering the question under discus-
sion to make a somewhat wider synthesis of cognate rules of
law than Mr. Bruton attempts, and also to make a fuller con-
sideration of reasons of policy.
The distinction in the common law between "things that lie
in grant and things that lie in livery" is an old one. Ordi-
nary choses in action (when the limitations on the assignment
of such property imposed by the early common law disappear)
fall naturally in the class of things that lie in grant; that is,
they are appropriately transferred by deed or contract.
The rights of which the Restatemeznt stated that gifts can be
made by delivery are subjected to the same rule as that govern-
ing gifts of chattels. The tangible instruments represent the
intangible rights in common speech and in common business
usage. The law has wisely recognized this business usage, not
only because it is one upon which people act, but because it is
one upon which they may safely act, since possession of the
document is essential to the collection of the claim. This is not
true of written contracts as a class.
The English Statute of Frauds requires for the enforceability
of a sale of goods, or of a contract to sell them, if they are of
the price of ten pounds or more, that there shall be a memoran-
dum in writing of the bargain signed by the parties to be
charged unless there shall be acceptance and actual receipt of
all or part of the goods, or either full or partial payment for
them. This section is substantially re-enacted in most of the
47204 Pa. 167, 53 Atl. 746 (1902).
4s Mr. Bruton states that Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231, 91 Pac. 950
(1907) was a similar case. This is an error. In the Washington case the
deed of conveyance for which the money was payable was delivered by the
donor to the donee. Such a deed obviously is within the rule of the Restatc-
-,i 2eit.
Two other cases that were cited in the Reporter's notes to the Rcstatceicizt
as opposed to the rule therein laid down are also referred to by Mr. Bruton.
One of these, Murphy v. Bordwell, 83 Mlinn. 54' 85 N. W. 915 (1901), is
rather unusual on its facts and Mr. Bruton thinks the case may fall within
the rule of the Restatement. The other, Jones v. Mloore, 102 Ky. 591, 4.
S. W. 126 (1898), upheld a gift of book accounts by delivery of the book.
This case is as obnoxious to ir. Bruton's suggested rule as to that of the
Restateient. A book of accounts does not state the terms of the contracts
with the debtors, and, furthermore, it is written by the creditor, not the
debtor. Since Kentucky also sustains, contrary to the great weight of
authority, a gift of a checking account made by delivery of the pass book




United States. In England it is settled that choses in action,
though evidenced by tangible documents of the sort covered by
the rule of the Restatement, are not included under the designa-
tion, "goods, wares and merchandise." , In the United States,
however, under statutes similar to the English original, certifi-
cates of stock, bonds, bills and notes, are held to be within the
statute.0 In some states choses in action have been included
by the express words of the statute, or the wide term "personal
property" has been used.51 The Uniform Sales Act expressly
includes choses in action in the section corresponding to the
English Statute of Frauds. This Act is now in force in more
than thirty jurisdictions. Thus it is generally true that to make
an enforceable sale, or a contract for the sale, of a chose in
action, either some part of the price must be paid, or there must
be acceptance and actual receipt of the chose in action, or there
must be a memorandum in writing.
It seems unlikely that the possibility of satisfying the Statute
by acceptance and actual receipt can extend beyond any larger
class of choses in action than those of which the Restatement
allows gifts by delivery.5 2 As to others, there must be consider-
ation actually paid or a memorandum in writing evidencing the
transfer. If this is true, it would surely be anomalous to allow
gifts of choses in action to be made with greater freedom and
less formality than the law requires for sales of them.
In discussing the policy of the rule suggested by Mr. Bruton,
argument may be directed (1) to the question whether it is
desirable to go further than the rule of the Restatement goes in
making informal gifts of choses in action possible, and (2)
whether the particular extension suggested by Mr. Bruton is
desirable. On both these, questions I think the answer should
be in the negative. Choses in action now constitute by far the
greatest part of the property of most persons of means. Not
only is property intangible in its origin included within the
category, but a large part of the tangible property in the coun-
try is now subjected to the law governing choses in action by
the use of mortgages and corporate shares of stock. Gifts of
choses in action therefore involve far more serious questions
than gifts of chattels. In "view of this, since there is no diffi-
culty in making gifts of choses in action when desired (for un-
questionably a formal assignment in writing, and perhaps also
an informal written assignment, is enough to effect the pur-
pose) ,53 it seems to me distinctly undesirable to go further




S3 Chase National Bank v. Sayles, 11 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926),
certiorari refused, 273 U. S. 708, 47 Sup. Ct. 99 (1926).
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and make gifts of choses in action valid with less formality
than gifts of land or even of chattels. The necessity of some
formality is particularly emphasized because most of the gifts
that come into question are made in immediate contemplation
of death. Indeed, the problem under consideration rarely arises
except in such cases. If a donor is alive and really means to
give away his rights, he can and ordinarily will make good any
inadequacy in his first attempt. From a practical standpoint
the requirements of the law for the transfer of an intangible
right may appropriately be compared with those for the trans-
mission of property by will. The law requires elaborate for-
mality for such transmission. This sometimes defeats reason-
able and proper intentions of a deceased owner, but the protec-
tion against fraud and the certainty given by the required for-
malities have been thought a sufficient answer to that objection.
Is it worth while to increase the number of alleged donees who
asserit after the death of an owner that a gift has been made,
when nobody can contradict the assertion and the donee's evi-
dence must be taken as true? In view of the magnitude of pos-
sible interests, I think it is not wise. The cases are common
enough where a person in charge of one at the point of death
truly or falsely asserts that a gift has been made to him, and
produces something easily obtainable to establish the assertion.
It seems better to confine protection to cases where the docu-
ment in question is one that is ordinarily kept in a safe deposit
box, and is of the sort that owners regard not simply as evi-
dence, but as the property itself, or its equivalent. I agree with
the remarks of Lord Chancellor Ashbourne:
"Speaking for myself, I do not look with any particular favor
on these death-bed gifts. The current of authority shows that
Courts require claims resting on such gifts to be closely scruti-
nized, and to be made out clearly and satisfactorily, without e-x-
tending the class of things which have already been held cap-
able of transmission mortis causa." -
I find fault not only with any extension of the rule of the
Restatement but also with the particular rule advocated by Mr.
Bruton. First, I object to it because of its uncertainty. Written
contracts may be of various degrees of brevity, and in cases
under the Statute of Frauds, very abbreviated writings indeed
have been held to fulfil the requirements which Mr. Bruton
thinks sufficient.
Further, I do not find that the cases upon which Mr. Bruton
relies clearly lay down any such rule. A rule is, indeed, sug-
gested in some cases (and in my opinion this has caused
the subject to be more uncertain than it should be) that "if
5 Duckworth v. Lee, supra note 28.
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such delivery is made as the subject matter admits of" the
gift will be protected. If carried to its logical limit this means
that if the subject matter admits of no delivery, no delivery
is necessary. Probably no court would go so far; but how far
a court which adopted a rule such as I have quoted would go is
left in fog. No doubt this is much worse than what Mr. Bruton
suggests, but both rules are open in varying degrees to the same
objection.
Furthermore, I emphatically disagree with this statement of
Mr. Bruton: "The chief value of the requirement of delivery is
the fact that the act of transferring the property is evidence
of the donor's intent and, perhaps, what is more important,
serves to impress upon the donor the significance of his act."
I agree that evidence of the donor's intent is important, without
thinking, however, that possession of a written contract is very
satisfactory evidence of that intent, especially if, as is usually
the case, the donor is dead. But at least one vitally important
effect of delivery is omitted and that is the dominion which Lord
Hardwicke emphasized and which so frequently has been re-
ferred to since. Mr. Bruton points out that in litigation against
the debtor any written contract sought to be enforced is as truly
best evidence as the documents included in the rule of the Re-
statement. But all assigned claims are not litigated, nor is it
desirable that they should be. On the contrary, it is desirable
that the possession of the document should carry with it with-
out litigation the implication that the possessor is the person
entitled to receive performance, and, what is more important,
that nobody without that document is entitled to receive per-
formance.
The suggestion is made that possession is of diminishing im-
portance in the law. I believe ihis to be a mistake. The early
identification of possession or seisin with ownership has of
course long since passed away, but it does not follow that pos-
session is not still a vital fact; and in recent years the tendency
of legislation has shown a distinct disposition to emphasize the
importance of possession as evidence of ownership. Negotiabil-
ity enlarges the rights which an innocent purchaser of a nego-
tiable instrument acquires by possession from one whose title is
defective. * The common law recognized as possible types of ne-
gotiable instruments only bills of exchange and promissory
notes, though what was vaguely called quasi-negotiability was
attributed to warehouse receipts and bills of lading. At the
present time in almost all of the United States warehouse re-
ceipts running to order are negotiable. The same is true
throughout the United States of all interstate bills of lading
running to order and, in many states, of similar intrastate bills.
Certificates of stock have also been made negotiable by statute
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in many states. Under these documents the ownership of an
enormous portion of the personal property of the country is now
in such form as to be freely negotiable. Factors' Acts and Bulk
Sales Acts afford further illustration of the importance attached
to possession as indicative of ownership. Similarly statutes
requiring the recording of conditional sales, most of which have
been enacted in recent years for the protection of creditors and
purchasers from a conditional buyer, present still another in-
stance of growing emphasis on the importance of the control or
dominion that possession gives.
In spite of occasional inconsistent decisions, there seems no
disposition in modern law to limit the necessity of delivery of
chattel property in order to create a valid gift. Moreover, not
only in regard to gifts but even in the case of sales of such
property, the dominion, which possession gives, is vital. It is
so important that an actual sale without delivery is in most
states presumptively fraudulent, and in a few states conclusively
fraudulent. By the provisions of the Sales Act it is provided
(and this was probably generally law in the United States aside
from statute) that a second innocent buyer with delivery pre-
vails over one to whom the seller has previously sold the goods
without delivery. The first buyer may have paid the full price,
but the second buyer prevails. This doubtless represents also
the early English law, when seisin and title were synonymous;
and though subsequently the English court expressed a contrary
opinion,- the English Parliament by the Factors' Act of 1889
reverted to the old position.
The provision of the French Code, ca fait de mncubles, lo. pos-
session vaut titre, i though limited by a provision that one from
whom goods have been stolen, or who has lost them, has a right
to reclaim for three years, shows that the English and American
conception of the importance of possession and of the dominion
that possession gives is not peculiar to the Common Law.
It can hardly be denied that the decisions upholding gifts of
bonds, deeds, bills and notes, certificates of stock, savings bank
books, policies of insurance, have relied mainly on the fact that
possession of the documents gives control of the choses in action
of which they are evidence. The obligor can and will demand
surrender of the document before making payment. Posses-
sion of it has the same practical effect as possession of ordinary
chattel, property.
The question under consideration is important not only as
between the donor or his representatives and the donee. As-
signors sometimes in fraud of the first assignee make a second
55 See Bleyerstein v. Barber, L. R. 2 C. P. 38, 51 (1866).




assignment. It is not essential to the effective assignment of a
right under an ordinary written contract that the assignee shall
possess the writing. The debtor is justified by business usage
in paying without production of the contract. Even without
any writing the owner of a right may give another person a
power to collect a claim and to keep the money if collected.
Assume such a gift of a right under an informal contract, and
later a gift of the writing, after which the former donee in
good faith collects. Can he not keep what he has obtained?
I should say that he could. I do not know that Mr. Bruton's
rule suggests any answer. Again suppose a first assignment is
made by gift of an ordinary written contract, and a second
assignment of it is made by a written assignment for value to
an innocent purchaser. If the gift is completely effective the
first assignee prevails. I should prefer the second. Or assume
that the first assignee takes for value but does not get the
informal writing embodying the assigned, agreement. Does
he lose his right when a second assignment is made to a pur-
chaser for value in good faith who does acquire the writing?
Such problems as these admit, in my opinion, of no satisfactory
answer when attention is focussed merely on the requirement
of evidence that the donor intended to make a gift. If that
were enough, a statement before witnesses ought to serve as
well as delivery. The embarrassment of answering such ques-
tions and the possible frauds that the questions suggest are re-
duced to a minimum if the effectiveness of a gift by mere de-
livery of a document is admitted only when the document is of
a character that is essential according to law or business usage
for the collection of the claim.
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